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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The Government has recently issued a consultation document  which raises the possibility of a 
substantial change in the taxation of pensions.1  In this paper we assess the economic consequences 
of changing from the existing EET system (where pension savings and returns are exempt from 
income tax, but pension income is taxed) to a TEE system (pension savings would be from taxed 
income but with no further taxation thereafter), making use of two complementary approaches. 
First, we review the economic and empirical literature, and second we construct a general 
equilibrium overlapping generations (OLG) model parameterised to UK data and the UK tax system.  
Both approaches lead to the same outcome: that changing from EET to TEE would lead to a fall in 
personal savings. In addition, our analysis shows that the move would be counter to a series of 
pension reform principles the Government has set out. 
Our review of published literature shows most authors find EET (which is used in 22 of 30 OECD 
countries) more economically beneficial. This benefit manifests itself in an increased amount of 
personal and national saving, as well as in the risk on retirement portfolios, the effect on capital 
markets and overall benefits to economic growth.  
These findings are supported by our general equilibrium overlapping generations (OLG) model. OLG 
models are ideally suited to the analysis of life-cycle issues such as pensions, as they allow several 
cohorts or generations to be alive and interacting at once. General equilibrium allows us to capture 
all the complex feedback effects between taxes, savings decisions, and other variables such as 
investment, productivity, output (GDP), wages and interest rates.  
Our model shows that switching from EET to TEE would lead to a fall in personal savings, even if 
there are top-ups or subsidies from the Government. The intuition is simple: moving from EET to TEE  
frontloads the tax burden onto younger households. Bringing forward taxation would reduce the 
resources available to working aged households, leading to reductions in both consumption and 
savings. In addition, the current EET system provides added incentives for higher and additional rate 
taxpayers to save, in order to benefit from lower tax rates in retirement.  
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This reduction in savings would have broader macroeconomic consequences including lower 
aggregate consumption, a lower capital stock, lower productivity and a higher real interest rate. The 
Government has stated that any reform must encourage people to save more; our analysis suggests 
that the proposed policy change will deliver the opposite outcome. 
Another principle set out by the Government is that the proposal ought to be consistent with its 
fiscal framework. The TEE system would lead to an immediate tax revenue gain from removing the 
current tax relief, which would improve today’s headline fiscal deficit. However, this would be at the 
expense of tomorrow’s fiscal accounts. We note that the only scenario where output (almost) and 
consumption return to the levels comparable to the current EET system are with a 50% government 
pension subsidy which would likely be detrimental on a Whole Government Accounts basis. 
Our model also reveals that a move from EET to TEE is inconsistent with the Government’s 
requirement that any reform should encourage individuals to take personal responsibility for 
adequate retirement savings. There is a dynamic inconsistency problem inherent in TEE because no 
government can credibly commit to never re-introducing taxation on pension income given likely 
challenges ahead. Retirement savings largely depend on future Government pension policy, and it is 
easy to see that the scrapping of taxation on pension income might be reversed in the future. As a 
result, individuals would be less, rather than more, willing to take personal responsibility under a TEE 
regime.  
The final principal set out by the Government is that the policy is simple and transparent. We note 
that the transition from EET to TEE would require earmarking different pension pots of savings as 
accumulated under different tax regimes. The transitional costs for defined contribution pensions 
could be considerable (assuming they would be forced to pay additional top-ups out of taxed 
income). We are unconvinced that having separate pension savings under different tax regimes 
would be beneficial in terms of transparency and simplicity.    
1. INTRODUCTION
Like most advanced economies, the UK offers tax relief on pension savings. Generally, tax relief aims 
to avoid double taxation, and to encourage households to save adequately for retirement. 
Governments in all advanced countries intervene in pensions markets at a number of stages, 
including providing a state pension. These interventions may be justified on market failure grounds, 
as households are confronted by imperfect information, distortionary taxation on various forms of 
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income, and other barriers which might prevent them from attaining a first-best consumption 
smoothing outcome.   
In general, pensions can be taxed (T) or exempt (E) at the point of saving, when asset returns arise or 
when pension income is drawn. The current UK system is described as exempt-exempt-taxed 
(abbreviated to EET): pension saving is exempt from income tax (and national insurance), returns on 
pension savings are exempt from tax when they occur but pension income is subject to income tax 
(although not national insurance).  
The Government’s consultation document (hereafter, HMT Cm 9102) raises the possibility of a 
substantial change in the taxation of pensions. This change involves the timing of taxation. The 
proposal is to change to a system of pension tax relief described as taxed-exempt-exempt (TEE): 
pension savings would be from taxed income and (presumably) after national insurance but with no 
further taxation. This would be akin to the tax treatment of an ISA, possibly with  additional top-ups 
or subsidies from the Government. 
The Government sets out four principles any reform should meet: (a) simple and transparent; (b) 
allows individuals to take personal responsibility for adequate savings for retirement; (c) encourages 
people to save more; and (d) in line with the Government’s fiscal strategy. In addition, the 
Government noted that it must be mindful of the macroeconomic implications of reforms, the 
treatment of defined benefit and contribution pensions (especially in the public sector), the context 
of the wider tax system and the costs and implementation of any changes. 
The taxation of pensions directly affects households’ consumption and saving decisions, incentives 
to work, asset allocation decisions and government finances. It therefore matters for capital 
accumulation, productivity, economic growth, capital markets and welfare. The key point of this 
paper is that a robust analysis of the proposed changes requires a general equilibrium setting. The 
response of households and the consequences for the economy and government finances over time 
must be fully specified. Reliance on a partial equilibrium analysis can be misleading.2  
We develop a general equilibrium overlapping generations (OLG) model which incorporates the key 
features of the UK income tax and pensions system. We find that moving from the current EET to a 
more front-loaded TEE system would result in a substantial reduction in household savings, as well 
2 
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as lower rates of investment, a smaller capital stock, lower productivity and output, lower 
consumption, lower wages and an increase in the cost of capital. The intuition is straightforward: 
TEE serves to front-load taxation onto younger households, reducing the resources at their disposal. 
Thus, younger households with tighter budget constraints will choose to both save and consume 
less. This reduction in savings feeds through into lower investment and a reduction in the productive 
capital available to the economy, reducing productivity, output and wages. The reduction in the 
supply of capital would also serve to bid up the cost of capital.  
These core findings are based on a general equilibrium OLG model, which we present fully in section 
3. We would strongly recommend that any evaluation of these or alternative proposals is conducted 
in this framework, albeit extended to include life cycle incomes and uncertainty. 
 
(a) The UK pensions challenge               
Advanced countries face a pension challenge arising from the increase in longevity. In the UK this has 
been combined with falling coverage by occupational and personal pensions, in particular defined 
benefit (DB) pension schemes. Since automatic enrolment in 2012, the trend has reversed. While 
only 9% to 10% have opted-out of their workplace pension, it is unclear whether this has been offset 
by reduced saving elsewhere and what the overall impact on national saving has been.3 The share of 
employees with defined benefit pensions has continued to decline. More than 70% of new 
occupational pensions are defined contribution (DC) pensions. This means households, rather than 
firms, are increasingly exposed to investment risk  and longevity risk (they live longer) in their 
pensions and higher costs associated with old age. This has an important bearing on the taxation of 
pensions. 
The extent of government involvement, or support for the pension system, inevitably depends on 
public finances. HMT Cm 9102 suggests that the current system of tax relief on pensions may cost 
£21.2bn in lost income taxes and £14bn in lost national insurance contributions each year.4 This 
includes an estimated £7bn for the investment income tax exemption, but this would not be 
collected under the new proposal. The costs of tax relief are  offset by higher taxes paid when 
pension incomes are drawn. While HMT Cm9102 acknowledges that the figures may misrepresent 
the true cost of the existing tax system due to differences in the timing of payments and changes in 
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tax rates (lower taxes reduce the estimate), there are additional reasons why HMT’s figure could be 
a substantial overstatement. For one, comparing the contributions of today’s workforce to today’s 
pensioners’ income (yesterday’s workforce) ignores wage inflation, population growth and changes 
in longevity. More importantly, HMT’s accounting exercise ignores the impact that withdrawal of tax 
relief on pension savings might have on household savings, with knock-on effects to investment, 
GDP, and of course the size of the tax base and amount of tax revenues collected. We will quantify 
these effects in section 3 of this paper. 
The Treasury’s reform proposal would lead to an immediate increase in tax revenue for the 
Government. Whether this means an improvement in the fiscal balance depends on the size of the 
subsidy the Government proposes in order to increase the attractiveness of pension saving. In our 
analysis we have carried out scenarios for a range of subsidies, from 10% to 50% of pension saving. 
However, moving to TEE would also erode the future tax base, as the Government would be 
promising not to tax future pension income. This might be storing up problems for the future.  
When deciding on changes to pension taxation, consideration must also be given to appropriate risk 
sharing between governments and households. This is not an issue of higher expected cost, but 
smoothing out year to year uncertainties (upside and downside) which are much easier for a 
government that can always borrow. For an individual household, year to year shocks can prove very 
difficult to manage, particularly if they occur in retirement. There is usually little possibility to return 
to work to top-up savings. Governments face a different budget constraint to households. Some 
risks (e.g. associated with financial failure or natural disasters) are best managed by a government. 
Some economists refer to this government function as the ‘risk manager of last resort’ as this is one 
of the fundamental roles of government (along with defence). The risk sharing properties of pension 
tax regimes are important for welfare. 
Taxation of pensions               
The taxation of pensions begins with the general principle of taxing saving. A tax system which does 
not distort the decision of how much to consume today versus how much to save and consume 
tomorrow would leave the after tax (and risk adjusted) real rate of return on savings assets 
unchanged. Abstracting from risk, the real rate of interest in competitive equilibrium is equal to the 
subjective discount rate households apply to future consumption. In a competitive market, first-best 
efficiency requires this return on savings to be tax free. Any returns in excess of the risk free rate 
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would be down to skill and therefore subject to tax. Under the current EET system, there is some 
taxation of investment returns.5 Higher returns also lead to a higher final pension which is subject to 
tax. Note that interest income on deposits and dividends on stocks are taxed, which discourages 
saving. Returns on ISAs are not taxed. However, ISAs are saved out of taxed income, i.e. ISAs are 
taxed as TEE.6 
There may of course be good reasons for taxing pensions more leniently. These include, first, that 
people are generally myopic and mistakenly under-save the amount required to generate the 
retirement living standards they prefer (Diamond 1977) and second, to encourage people to save to 
reduce their need for state pensions.7 Moreover, since pension savings are usually illiquid, or cannot 
be accessed until retirement, there ought to be some compensation for this illiquidity to prevent 
under-saving. In the UK, this is the rationale for up to one quarter of all accumulated pension capital 
being accessible at retirement free of any tax, i.e. they are taxed EEE. To replace this incentive under 
the TEE proposal, the Government would provide a pension subsidy at the point of saving (of an as 
yet unspecified amount). 
If the real rate of interest was suitably taxed, and there was one tax rate for all levels of income and 
no uncertainty, then taxing income when it is earned or drawn as a pension would not affect the 
incentives to save at the margin. However, all tax systems are progressive and workers have some 
flexibility in the amount of work they supply.8 Since income tends to be lower in retirement, 
progressive taxation encourages workers to save more for retirement while working.9 This is a 
distortion which encourages earlier and greater savings under EET than TEE. Emmerson (2014) 
points out that the EET system allows taxpayers an extra degree of freedom to smooth consumption 
over their life cycle: taxpayers with an accentuated life-cycle income profile can shift income to 
retirement via pension savings, to avoid paying higher marginal tax rates earlier in the life-cycle 
when their income might be higher.  
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Moreover, even if EET and TEE led to the same marginal incentives to save, they would still affect the 
household budget constraints in different ways. By allowing households to save out of untaxed 
income, EET offers a tax subsidy to pension savings, which increases the resources available to divide 
between consumption and pension savings when young. By first principles, EET should increase both 
consumption and savings for the working aged. In contrast, by shifting taxation of pensions forward, 
TEE withdraws resources from working-aged households relative to EET, so that working aged 
households (ceteris paribus) consume and save less under TEE.  
EET also allows for greater risk sharing than TEE. In a DC pension, if asset prices fall at the date of 
retirement this implies a loss of pension income. However, under the EET system this is partly offset 
by reduced income tax. Of course the opposite can also happen with excess returns. Thus, the 
growing prevalence of DC pensions draws another distinction between EET and TEE. 
The change in tax regime must also be considered in the context of the treatment of other assets. 
UK households have just over £9.4tn in assets: housing wealth of £4.2tn; pension and insurance 
assets of £3.1tn; currency and deposits of £1.3tn; other financial assets of £0.6tn.10 Housing wealth 
and ISAs are essentially taxed under the TEE tax regime, currency and deposits and other financial 
assets under a TTE regime and only pension assets under EET. If the tax regime were to change to 
TEE for pensions, the tax treatment of pensions would be very similar to that of owner-occupied 
housing and ISAs.  Storing wealth in an owner-occupied house or an ISA has the advantage of being 
accessible (on disposal), whereas pensions are usually locked-up until retirement. Without some sort 
of additional sweetener, such as a top-up to pension savings, it is difficult to see why households 
would choose an inaccessible pension to a fully accessible ISA or owner-occupied housing.  
There are also distributional consequences to the current EET system. Higher income earners gain 
the largest relief from income tax. While they are likely to pay more tax when drawing their 
pensions, they are overall likely to gain more than lower income earners from the EET relative to the 
TEE system. This is a consequences of the progressive tax system more than the difference in the 
timing of taxation (higher earners pay more tax and so inevitably get more relief). Distributional 
concerns can be addressed directly. Recent reforms limit the benefits of EET to the highest earners 
as employee contributions cannot exceed 100% of salary, and there is a limit for each individual of 
£40,000 on tax free contributions per annum and a cap on total accumulation of £1.25 million.11 It 
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would also be possible to restrict tax relief on pensions to the basic rate (or to some other rate 
below the top marginal rate), as is now the case with childcare vouchers.   
When tax remission is in the future rather than being immediate, there is always the risk that future 
governments will act to raise taxes on pensions (“reneging on the pension promise”), thus making 
pension saving less attractive. Taxation will always be the right of the government, which includes 
the right to change policy in future. Given that it is well understood that there are pension 
challenges in the future, other contingent risks (such as the financial sector) and the time lapse 
between current and future taxation policy, there is no commitment device to overcome this 
dynamic inconsistency problem. This is directly analogous to the motivation for making the Bank of 
England independent.12 There is also a case of such opportunistic behaviour regarding the taxation 
of pensions in New Zealand in the late 1980s which led to a collapse in pension saving (St John 
2007).13 
In addition, the regimes are not all equally easy to implement. Taxing contributions under TEE is by 
no means straightforward, especially for employer contributions which are often pooled across 
groups of employees with differing marginal tax rates. In the transition, providers and schemes 
would have to segregate savings built up under the current EET tax regime from those built up under 
the new tax regime. This would be costly and may add to the burden of complexity for households. 
Employers with DB plans may face particular difficulties. If top-up payments under TEE are taxed, the 
costs to firms offering DB plans would rise markedly. Moreover, it is not clear whether TEE would 
also apply to national insurance contributions for employees and employers. Having different tax 
treatment for pension and national insurance contributions would add to complexity; having the 
same treatment might amount to a considerable payroll tax. Labour mobility across countries could 
also be affected, since most other OECD countries have EET. Shifting to TEE would make cross-
border pension issues more complex.  
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2. LITERATURE SURVEY ON PENSION TAXATION AND THE MACROECONOMY 
In this literature review, we summarise the published evidence on the economic effects of  pension 
taxation regimes. We start by noting that Yoo and de Serres (2005) report that 22 of 30 OECD 
countries use the EET regime. Most authors find EET is more economically beneficial, owing to tax 
deferment and the benefit of saving from pre-tax income. This benefit manifests itself in increased 
pension saving, personal saving, national saving, as well as in the risk on retirement portfolios, their 
effect on capital markets and overall benefits to economic growth. Furthermore, we highlight 
evidence of beneficial risk sharing under EET, and an incentive to switch from pensions into more 
liquid alternative assets such as housing under TEE. 
(a) Effects on pension saving 
Whitehouse (1999) suggests that under strict assumptions, TEE and EET are equally optimal. 
However, this arises from unrealistic assumptions, as in Huang (2008), where no regular 
contributions are paid during accumulation, only an initial one, and thus the marginal tax rates 
during work and retirement are identical, making EET and TEE regimes equivalent. Most authors, 
including Beetsma et al (2011), show that under realistic circumstances this equivalence breaks 
down. The marginal tax rate during retirement is typically lower than during working life. Hence, 
pension savings are more attractive under the EET regime and saving in this form is more likely to be 
chosen due to such tax deferment. Kudrna and Woodland (2012) provide an OLG model based on 
Australia where they simulate the effects of switching to an EET or TEE regime from TTE as the 
system stands now. They generally find EET to be superior. 
In assessing TEE versus EET, Chen et al (2013) undertake a theoretical analysis that takes the 
composition of a pension fund's investment portfolio as given. In the context of their framework 
they show that taxing income after pension contributions have been paid (EET) raises social welfare, 
not only because there is additional investment in pension wealth (due to tax deferral and 
investment from pre-tax income) but also because pension wealth earns a higher rate of return 
(benefiting from the so-called “equity premium”). Meanwhile, the reduction in future taxes by 
paying pension contributions on after-tax income under TEE effectively only earns the risk-free rate 
of return through a reduction in the public debt. Hence, the EET regime is superior to the TEE 
regime. 
In the light of these results, we now turn to the wider literature on the impact of funding on the 
macroeconomy, on the basis that changes in taxation from EET to TEE will reduce pension saving as 
suggested above. We provide evidence that higher pension savings implies that personal saving is 
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higher, and that higher pension saving may also benefit national saving despite the offset in terms of 
lower government saving. 
(b) Effects on personal saving 
In considering whether pension saving tends to boost overall personal saving, a key question is 
whether rising pension assets simply offset other forms of personal saving. This may be seen as 
likely, given the usual economic assumption that people have a life-cycle savings plan that would not 
necessarily change by the form in which saving occurs. Nevertheless, in principle, pension saving 
could generate increased total personal saving via the following channels (for an overview, see Kohl 
and O’Brien (1998)): 
 Pension assets are illiquid which may mean that other household wealth may not be 
reduced one-to-one when pension assets increase. This is because households may not see such 
claims as a perfect substitute for liquid saving such as deposits. This argument is supported by the 
fact that many pension laws prohibit pensioners from borrowing against their future pension 
benefits. 
 There may be liquidity constraints whereby some households are not free to borrow. This 
may imply that any forced saving (such as pension contributions) cannot be offset either by 
borrowing or by reducing discretionary saving. An observationally equivalent outcome is that the 
interaction between the need for retirement income and retirement security may increase saving in 
a growing economy, as workers increase saving to provide for an earlier planned retirement. 
 The lower effective marginal income tax rate under EET will increase labour supply relative 
to TEE, all else equal. This will lead to a fall in the capital to labour ratio and a higher real interest 
rate and higher investment (and saving) and higher output. 
Turning to relevant theoretical contributions, Imrohoroglu et al (1998) use a dynamic OLG model to 
quantify the increases in the capital stock and savings from tax-favoured Individual Retirement 
Accounts (IRAs) in the United States. They find a 6% increase in the capital stock, albeit only 9% of 
IRA contributions are calculated to constitute additional saving.14 Kitao (2010) extends Imrohoroglu, 
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et al (ibid) to include a variable labour supply. The author finds that an IRA tax-favoured savings 
account can have a strong positive impact on savings and output in a dynamic general equilibrium 
OLG model, as it increases the effective after-tax return of saving. 
As regards empirical work, research suggests on balance that growth in pension saving boosts overall 
personal saving, but not one-to-one (i.e. there is some offset). A significant offset arises via declines 
in discretionary saving. Much of the literature is focused on the impact on household saving of the 
growth of U.S. DB funds, and on balance the results suggest an increase in personal saving of around 
0.35–0.5 results from every unit increase in pension fund assets (Pesando 1992). As regards DC 
funds, Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1996) suggest that individual pension accounts in the US (401(k)’s) 
have added to aggregate saving consistent with the theoretical work noted above. Tax incentives are 
one important reason, but employer matching of contributions, payroll deduction schemes and 
information seminars may also be relevant factors in encouraging overall private saving by this 
route.  
Reisen and Bailliu (1997) examine pension reform in 11 countries, including both advanced OECD 
and emerging market economics (EMEs). They find that the impact of moving from unfunded to 
funded pension schemes on saving is positive in all cases, but significantly larger for EMEs than in 
OECD countries. This was thought to reflect the less developed capital markets, meaning that 
individuals are less able to borrow in order to offset the pension saving that they are obliged to 
make. On the other hand, even in a liberalized financial system as in the UK, such credit constraints 
will affect lower income individuals particularly, as they have no assets to pledge and less secure 
employment. Therefore, institutional saving will tend to boost their overall saving particularly 
markedly (for evidence, see Bernheim and Scholz (1992)). 
(c) Effects on national saving 
This section outlines work on the impact of pension reforms on overall national saving (government 
and the private sector). While the evidence so far suggests that EET systems result in higher private 
savings, the consequence for national saving depends on the response of governments. On balance, 
the evidence suggests an overall positive effect. 
James (1996) argues that one main advantage of the World Bank multi-pillar model approach to 
assessing the impact of pension reform is that national saving as well as personal saving could be 
boosted. But any effect of pension fund growth on personal saving could be offset at the level of 
national saving by the impact on public finances of the costs of tax subsidies to personal saving. For 
example in Pesando (1992) as cited above, the cost to the public sector of the tax incentives to 
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pension funds reduces the overall benefit of pension saving to national savings to around 0.2 per 
unit as compared to 0.5 per unit for personal saving. 
Nevertheless, Lopez Murphy and Musalem (2004), using a panel of 43 industrial and developing 
countries, find evidence suggesting that the accumulation of pension fund financial assets might 
indeed increase national saving, when these funds are the result of a mandatory pension 
programme. The boost to personal saving is greater than the increased borrowing the public sector 
has to undertake. By contrast, national saving might be less affected when pension funds are the 
result of a public programme, implemented to foster voluntary pension saving, as is effectively the 
case in the UK. 
(d) Effects on financial markets 
Abstracting from the question of whether pension reform indeed boosts saving, it is useful to view 
pension reform more broadly as aiding financial market depth, which may also stimulate growth. An 
EET tax regime implies that the government assumes some of the risk of the pension portfolio, a 
beneficial risk sharing mechanism for households, allowing them to accept more risk than otherwise. 
The literature reviewed in this section shows that this is indeed the case, with pension savings 
leading to increased supply of equity and long-term (as opposed to short-term) debt or bank deposit 
finance, as well as improved corporate governance. 
The implication is that pension funding via EET increases the supply of long-term funds to capital 
markets. There may be increases in the supply of equities, long-term corporate bonds and 
securitised debt instruments and a reduction in the supply of bank deposits. A lower cost of equity 
finance can be beneficial to economic and financial stability as it implies lower debt/equity ratios in 
the corporate sector. This may be contrasted with the likely boost to house prices which may arise 
from a switch to TEE as discussed below. 
Catalan et al (2000) sought to identify empirically whether there is a Granger-causality relation 
between capital markets and contractual savings (i.e. whether rises in the former consistently 
preceded increases in the latter). They used two capital market indicators, stock market 
capitalisation and stock market value traded across 26 countries, among which 6 are developing 
countries. They gave evidence that contractual saving institutions, e.g. pension funds, Granger-cause 
capital market development in this sense. The potential benefits of developing contractual saving 
sectors are, however, stronger for developing countries than for developed countries. 
As noted, such overall shifts to long-term assets should tend to reduce the cost and increase the 
availability of equity and long-term debt financing to companies, and hence may raise productive 
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capital formation. Particularly for existing firms with small equity bases, there may be important 
competitive advantages to be reaped from equity issuance in terms of growth potential as well as 
reducing risks of financial distress in case of economic downturn; furthermore, long-term debt 
finance is correlated with higher growth for manufacturing firms (Caprio and Demirgüç-Kunt 1998).  
There may also be beneficial influences of pension fund growth on long-term debt finance (which 
may attenuate changes to the debt/equity ratio). In a cross country estimation, Impavido et al (2003) 
found a positive relationship between contractual saving assets and bond market capitalisation/GDP, 
whereby a 1 per cent increase in the former leads to a 0.4 per cent rise in the latter. On the other 
hand, they include public as well private bond issuance to proxy bond market development, where 
the former is driven by government needs rather than being mainly influenced by the state of 
demand. Improving on this, Hu (2004) shows empirically that growth of pension funds stimulates 
private bond finance, notably in developing countries, both in the short and long run. 
There is a growing literature on the positive impact of corporate governance initiatives on 
performance. For example, Faccio and Lasfer (2000) show that the monitoring role of UK pension 
funds is concentrated among mature and low-performing firms. Furthermore, in the long run, the 
firms in which pension funds have large stakes markedly improve their stock returns (see also Wahal 
1996, Del Guercio and Hawkins 1999). Bijlsma et al (2014) suggest that growing pension savings lead 
to deeper capital markets. They study this effect using data on 69 industrial sectors in 34 OECD 
countries for the period 2001-2010 through an approach that allows for the interaction of financial 
development with industry dependence on external finance.15 They found a significant impact of 
higher level of pension savings on growth in industrial sectors that are more dependent on external 
finance, which means higher pension saving may boost economic growth more generally. 
(e) Effects on economic growth 
A number of empirical papers suggest that there is a positive effect of pension savings on growth 
directly and via total factor productivity (TFP).16 A reform towards TEE, if it reduces pension saving, 
may put these wider economic benefits in jeopardy. 
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 Technically, this is a difference-in-differences approach that also takes into account unobserved 
heterogeneity by including country-time, industry-time and industry-country fixed effects. 
16
 Kudrna and Woodland (2012) note that in their model of pension tax reform, TEE reduces labour supply due 
to reduced working hours of middle-age and older working households that face increased income tax rates as 
contributions are treated under the progressive income taxation. On the other hand, the shift to the EET 
regime leads initially to higher per capita labour supply, because the current middle-age and older working 
households supply more labour in order to boost their pension savings. 
15 
 
Davis (2006) undertook empirical work focusing on the nexus of pension funds, population ageing 
and TFP. Does ageing lead to lower productivity, and can pension funds offset such a tendency by 
leading to a more dynamic economy as suggested above? Using data for 72 countries, he found 
pension funds impact positively on TFP. He also found an offsetting negative effect on productivity 
from ageing, which funding is able to partly offset, if past relationships continue to hold. The overall 
implication for policymakers is that care is needed in tax changes in view of benefits to economic 
growth that pension funding can bring, especially in the context of adverse effects on economic 
performance that may arise from ageing. 
Further evidence on a link from pension fund assets to economic growth indicators, covering 35 
countries is provided in Hu (2004). His work again favours a strong positive link between pension 
assets and TFP. He suggested that a direct effect (additional to that via financial development) might 
link to lesser labour distortions following pension reform, and pension funds’ increasing participation 
in corporate governance, thus improving corporate performance at the firm level and economic 
productivity on the macro level as suggested above.17  
Davis and Hu (2008) used a dataset covering 38 countries to investigate the direct link between 
pension assets and economic growth. Results showed that a rise in pension assets boosts output per 
worker initially and then follows a gradual decline, but during the whole specified period the effect 
remains positive. The positive effect on output per worker of a shock to pension assets is larger in 
EMEs and also remains significant for longer than in advanced countries. Furthermore, a positive 
average long-run relationship between pension assets and economic growth across countries is 
suggested by other advanced econometric approaches estimated with the same dataset.18  
Bijlsma et al (2013) estimated the relationship between the change in the ratio of pension assets to 
GDP and economic growth itself in a range of countries. They found a statistically significant and 
robust link, suggesting a rise in GDP of 0.24-0.30 percentage points occurs for every 10% rise in the 
ratio of pension assets to GDP. A larger effect was found in countries such as the UK and the 
Netherlands with established funded systems of pension provision. These relationships are stable, 
and there was no indication that a system of funded pensions makes countries more vulnerable 
during the financial crisis. 
  
                                                     
17
 Estimation results for investment and growth per se are ambiguous and not significant. A further regression 
for the impact of pension assets on growth over 1996-2002 using initial pension fund assets in 1996 as the 
causal variable is successful in terms of all three indicators. 
18
 Dynamic heterogeneous models and dynamic ordinary least squares models. 
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(f) Effect on risk sharing 
EET is superior to TEE in terms of risk sharing across generations and between retirees and the 
government. For households, EET reduces their full exposure to a fall in asset prices on retirement.  
Beetsma et al (2011) show that the government shares risk with households in the asset market 
under the EET regime, as it risks getting lower taxes if asset prices are low in retirement. This can be 
seen as economically beneficial. It also potentially increases the appropriate risk level of the pension 
fund’s portfolio, which may be beneficial in terms of long-term asset returns and consequent 
attractiveness of pension saving. This result implies that EET provides more risk capital to the capital 
markets, which is favourable for entrepreneurship and also implies a more stable corporate sector 
with potentially a lower debt/equity ratio. 
Similarly, Romaniuk (2013) analyses the optimal pension fund portfolio assuming people seek to 
maximise utility in retirement. The taxes levied under the TEE regime do not affect the amount of 
portfolio risk, while those under the EET tended to increase risk, consistent with risk sharing with the 
state. A quantitative impact of development of pension funds on capital markets must arise mainly 
from differences in behaviour from the personal sector. Pension funds in most cases hold a greater 
proportion of equities and bonds as a proportion of their assets than households do.19  
Chen et al (2013) consider the role of intergenerational risk-sharing through retirement income and 
public debt under EET and TEE (public debt is higher under EET due to tax deferral). It is shown that 
the potential for intergenerational risk-sharing depends substantially on which taxation regime 
prevails, with EET involving more beneficial risk sharing across generations than TEE. For example, 
under TEE low asset prices in retirement mean lower pensions and lower tax revenue to repay public 
debt (due to the covariance). 
(g) Effects on demand for housing 
Pensions are typically given tax privileges relative to other forms of saving, inter alia, to offset their 
illiquidity (they are often locked-up until retirement). In the context of the possible reform of the 
pension taxation regime from EET to TEE, there is no benefit to pension saving as a form of 
accumulation of wealth which is unavailable until retirement, as opposed to a much more liquid ISA 
or housing (which also benefits from TEE treatment) – unless the subsidy to pension savings were 
sufficient to compensate for its illiquidity. This implies that a shift from EET to TEE would affect the 
relative attractiveness of pension saving. Given that housing is the most attractive form of holding 
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 For example, in 2013 the share of equities and mutual funds in UK household portfolios was 12% compared 
with 44% for pension funds. 
17 
 
wealth, the projected ongoing shortage of housing and the potential tax / liquidity advantage in 
favour of housing, there is a real risk that lower pension saving would be accompanied by greater 
demand for owner occupied housing as a store of value, driving house prices higher. The switch in 
wealth could be considerable with a meaningful impact on house prices and possibly even financial 
stability. This would transfer wealth from the young to the old, thereby deepening the pension 
challenges facing the country noted in Section 1. This is one reason why the government subsidy to 
encourage pension saving under TEE would have to be substantial.  
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3. MODELLING THE EFFECTS OF TEE VERSUS EET 
Next, we develop of general equilibrium OLG model to assess the impact on personal savings and 
the overall macroeconomy of switching from an EET to a TEE pension tax system. Higher personal 
saving is one of the four principles the Government explicitly states for the reforms, along with being 
mindful of the economic consequences (HMT cm9102 and see Section 1). To make an informed 
assessment requires understanding the impact on the change in consumption, labour supply, real 
interest rates and investment. In Section 2 we noted that most evidence in the academic literature 
on TEE is that private savings fall. However, all economies and pension systems are different and the 
impact will be economy specific.  
Another principle for assessing a possible switch in pension tax policy is its consistency with the 
Government’s fiscal strategy. We assume that any change in government revenue is offset through 
changes in government spending (and consumption taxes) to have a balanced impact on the budget.  
OLG models are ideally suited for the analysis of life-cycle issues such as pensions, as they allow 
several cohorts or generations to be alive and interacting at once. General equilibrium allows us to 
capture all the complex feedback effects between taxes, savings decisions, and other variables such 
as investment, productivity, output (GDP), wages and interest rates. However, we note at the outset 
that we have made some important simplifications to make the model tractable and solvable while 
illustrating the key relationships. In particular we abstract from uncertainty and we do not include a 
bequest motive.20 Adding uncertainty would be particularly useful as this would highlight the 
importance of risk sharing discussed in Section 2.  
(a) Model setup 
In each period a cohort of identical individuals is born. Individuals live for 3 periods with certainty. 
They work for the first 2 periods, and retire in the remaining period. We take period length to be 20 
years, for a working life of 40 years. Individuals seek to maximise utility from consumption, and 
disutility from supplying labour. Our agents maximize the discounted sum of lifetime utilities: 
max
{𝑐𝑠,𝑙𝑠}𝑠=1
𝑆
∑𝛽𝑠−1𝑢(𝑐𝑠, 𝑙𝑠)
3
𝑠=1
= 𝑢(𝑐1, 𝑙1) + 𝛽𝑢(𝑐2, 𝑙2) + 𝛽
2𝑢(𝑐3, 𝑙3) 
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 Bequests clearly occur, but the strength of the bequest motive is open to question. Dynan, Skinner and 
Zeldes (2004) show that households report only 8% of bequests are due to wishing to bequeath an estate. So-
called ‘accidental bequests’ occur if savings are held for precautionary reasons and death happens first.     
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Working-aged agents choose how much labour to supply, how much to consume and by extension 
how much to save for retirement. Saving takes the form of long-term pension savings, which may 
not be accessed until retirement.21  
A working agent of productivity type 𝑗’s budget constraint in lifecycle period 𝑠 = 1,2 and at date 𝑡 is: 
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)𝑐𝑠,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑠𝑠,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑤𝑗,𝑡𝑙𝑠,𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑇(𝑤𝑗,𝑡𝑙𝑠,𝑗,𝑡, 𝑠𝑠,𝑗,𝑡) 
where 𝑐𝑠,𝑗,𝑡 is consumption of a type 𝑗 agent in life period 𝑠 at date 𝑡, 𝑠𝑠,𝑗,𝑡 are fixed or non-
accessible long-term pension savings, 𝑤𝑗,𝑡 is the date 𝑡 wage for an agent with productivity type 𝑗, 
with 𝑤𝑗,𝑡 = 𝜌𝑗𝑤𝑡.  Labour supply 𝑙𝑠,𝑗,𝑡 is elastic for the first two periods, and is assumed to be zero in 
the third and final period. Income tax liabilities 𝑇(𝑤𝑗,𝑡𝑙𝑠,𝑗,𝑡 , 𝑠𝑠,𝑗,𝑡) depend upon labour income, and 
possibly on the amount of pension savings. 
Pension savings accumulate into a pension capital stock   
𝑘𝑠,𝑗,𝑡+1 = 𝑘𝑠,𝑗,𝑡(1 + 𝑟𝑡+1 − 𝛿) + 𝑠𝑠,𝑗,𝑡(1 + 𝜏𝑏) 
where 𝑘𝑠,𝑗,𝑡+1 is the pension capital stock for type 𝑗 agent in life period 𝑠 at the beginning of date 
𝑡 + 1, 𝑟𝑡+1 is the rate of return on capital, 𝛿 is the depreciation rate, and 𝜏𝑏 is a top-up or subsidy to 
pension savings under the TEE system. Under EET 𝜏𝑏 = 0. Agents begin life with zero capital, so 
𝑘1,𝑗,𝑡 = 0. As they also do not wish to leave any bequests, so 𝑘4,𝑗,𝑡+3 = 0.  
The pension capital stock follows the accumulation equations: 
𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+1 = 𝑠1,𝑗,𝑡 
𝑘3,𝑗,𝑡+2 = 𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+1(1 + 𝑟𝑡+2 − 𝛿) + 𝑠2,𝑗,𝑡+1 
𝑘4,𝑗,𝑡+3 = 𝑘3,𝑗,𝑡+2(1 + 𝑟𝑡+3 − 𝛿) + 𝑠3,𝑗,𝑡+2 = 0 
where 𝛿 is the period-to-period rate of depreciation of the capital stock. Agents are not allowed to 
draw down their pensions until retirement, so we impose the restriction that pension savings for the 
working aged must be non-negative: 𝑠1,𝑗,𝑡, 𝑠2,𝑗,𝑡+1 ≥ 0.  
In retirement period 𝑠 = 3, individuals consume pension savings 𝑘3,𝑗,𝑡+2(1 + 𝑟𝑡+3 − 𝛿), along with a 
tax-financed state pension ?̃?. The income drawn from pension savings may be taxed.22  
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 We allow for fully accessible short-term savings, which are not tax-advantaged. Such fully accessible short-
term savings are made out of taxed income, the returns are taxed, but any income withdrawn is tax-free 
(taxed, taxed, exempt or TTE). In a model with certainty, however, there is no reason to use short-term 
savings, as there are no short-run fluctuations in income to even out or insure against. Agents do not use them 
as a long-run savings vehicle, because they provide a lower after-tax return than the tax-advantaged pension.  
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(1 + 𝜏𝑐)𝑐3,𝑗,𝑡+2 = (1 + 𝑟𝑡+3 − 𝛿)𝑘3,𝑗,𝑡+2 + ?̃? − 𝑇 ((1 + 𝑟𝑡+3 − 𝛿)𝑘3,𝑗,𝑡+2) 
(b) Modelling UK pension taxation 
In this section we consider the two tax relief regimes for long-term pension savings. We begin by 
summarising three different types of taxpayers and the UK income tax and NIC regime. 
Income tax is progressive. The tax relief offered by EET depends upon the individual's tax rate and 
income. We allow for three types of agents, who represent the average basic rate, higher rate and 
additional rate taxpayers. Agents differ by their productivity with 𝜌1 < 𝜌2 < 𝜌3, and as a result their 
wages also differ with the lowest productivity agent earning least 𝑤1 < 𝑤2 < 𝑤3. Wages are chosen 
to match average incomes in each tax band.23 The shares of each type of agent in the economy are 
chosen to match HMRC data on numbers of taxpayers in each tax band.24 78.4% of working aged 
taxpayers pay the basic rate, while 20.1% are in the higher rate band, and 1.5% are additional rate 
taxpayers with taxable incomes in excess of £150,000 annually (see Table 1).   
Table 1: The UK Tax System and Average Incomes within Each Tax Band 
 UK Tax System Working-Aged Individuals 
 Income Income 
Tax Rate 
NI Rate  NI Rate 
Pensioners 
Average 
Income 
Share of 
Working Age 
Tax-free < £10,600 0% 0% 0% - - 
Basic rate 
£10,600 to 
£42,465 
20% 12% 0% £21,920 78.4% 
Higher Rate 
£42,466 to 
£150,000 
40% 2% 0% £54,191 20.1% 
Additional 
Rate 
> £150,000 45% 2% 0% £257,965 1.5% 
Taxes are modelled on the UK income tax system. Income up to £10,600 is tax-free, income between 
£10,600 and £42,465 is taxed at the basic rate of 20%, income between £42,466 and £150,000 is 
taxed at the higher rate of 40%, while income in excess of £150,000 is taxed at the 45% upper rate 
(see Table 1). In addition, basic rate income is subject to National Insurance (NI) at a rate of 12%, 
while income in excess of the higher rate threshold of £42,465 is subject to a lower NI rate of 2%. 
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 We assume that pension income is subject to income tax but not National Insurance contributions. 
23
 HMRC, Income Tax Liabilities Statistics, 2011-12 to 2014-15, Table 2.6 reports tax liabilities in each band, 
from which taxable income can be inferred. Average pension contributions for each band, from HMRC Table 
3.8, are added to taxable income to obtain gross incomes.    
24
 Total numbers of individuals in each tax band can be calculated from HMRC Table 2.6. We are interested in 
the total numbers of working aged individuals in each tax band, so we subtract pensioners with taxable 
income, using data from HMRC Table 3.8.  
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Income of pensioners is subject to income tax, but not to NI. We assume 3 types of taxpayer 
corresponding to average income earners within each of the income tax bands. For example, the 
basic rate taxpayer has the average income taken across all UK basic rate taxpayers.  
As summarised in Section 1, under the current EET system a fraction of pension income (currently 
25%) can be drawn down as a tax-free lump sum making that sum effectively EEE. Under TEE, 
contributions to the pension are made out of taxed income and possibly topped up by a pension 
savings subsidy of 𝜏𝑏. In the remainder of this section, we model the implications of switching from 
EET to TEE, for a range of top-up subsidies 𝜏𝑏 to pension savings under TEE.  
(c) Exempt-Exempt-Taxed (EET) – Current UK system 
Under the EET regime, pension savings 𝑠𝑠,𝑗,𝑡 can be deducted from taxable income. Under the UK tax 
system, the working aged agent's budget constraints become: 
 (1 + 𝜏𝑐)𝑐1,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑠1,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑤𝑗,𝑡𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡 − 𝜏𝑙
𝑗
(𝑤𝑗,𝑡𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑠1,𝑗,𝑡) + 𝑇𝑗    (1) 
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1 + 𝑠2,𝑗,𝑡+1 = 𝑤𝑗,𝑡+1𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1 − 𝜏𝑙
𝑗
(𝑤𝑗,𝑡+1𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1 − 𝑠2,𝑗,𝑡+1) + 𝑇𝑗   (2) 
where 𝜏𝑙
𝑗
 is agent 𝑗's marginal tax rate, and 𝑇𝑗 is a lump sum term which accounts for lower rates of 
tax on the first tranches of income.25 𝑇𝑗 satisfies; 
𝑇𝑗 = {
𝜏𝑙,1?̅?1  𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝜏𝑙,1?̅?1 + 𝜏𝑙,2?̅?2   ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝜏𝑙,2?̅?2 + 𝜏𝑙,3?̅?3   𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
 
Substituting out for savings, working age budget constraints become:  
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)𝑐1,𝑗,𝑡 = (1 − 𝜏𝑙
𝑗
)𝑤𝑗,𝑡𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡 − (1 − 𝜏𝑙
𝑗
)𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+1 + 𝑇𝑗     (1’) 
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡 = (1 − 𝜏𝑙
𝑗
)𝑤𝑗,𝑡+2𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1 − (1 − 𝜏𝑙
𝑗
)[𝑘3,𝑗,𝑡+2 − 𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+1(1 + 𝑟𝑡+2
𝑓 − 𝛿)] + 𝑇𝑗    (2’) 
Agents are not allowed to draw down their pensions until retirement, so we impose the restriction 
that pension savings for the working aged must be non-negative: 𝑠1,𝑗,𝑡 , 𝑠2,𝑗,𝑡+1 ≥ 0. This translates 
into restrictions on the pension capital stocks: 𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+1 ≥ 0 and 𝑘3,𝑗,𝑡+2 ≥ 𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+1(1 + 𝑟𝑡+2
𝑓 − 𝛿). 
In retirement period 3, all savings and the state pension (financed out of tax revenues) are 
consumed. 25% of pension savings are tax-free under the UK's current EET system, while the 
                                                     
25 The tax functions are derived in Annex 1.  
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remainder is taxed as income. Agents also receive a fixed state pension ?̃? which is taxable. This 
leaves the retirement budget constraint as: 
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)𝑐3,𝑗,𝑡+2 = (1 + 𝑟𝑡+3 − 𝛿)𝑘3,𝑗,𝑡+2(1 − 𝜏𝑙,𝑗,𝑟𝑒𝑡0.75) + ?̃?(1 − 𝜏𝑙,𝑗,𝑟𝑒𝑡) + 𝑇𝑗,𝑟𝑒𝑡  (3) 
where once again 𝑇𝑗,𝑟𝑒𝑡 is a lump sum refund of personal allowance at agent 𝑗’s retirement tax band, 
and 𝜏𝑙,𝑗,𝑟𝑒𝑡 is the marginal tax rate in retirement for agent type 𝑗. For agents whose retirement 
income is below the lower rate threshold of £10,600, 𝜏𝑙,𝑗,𝑟𝑒𝑡 = 𝑇𝑗,𝑟𝑒𝑡 = 0. 
To solve the household’s problem we assume standard preferences over consumption and leisure, 
which satisfy: 
𝑢(𝑐) =
(𝑐𝛾(1 − 𝑙)1−𝛾)1−𝜎
1 − 𝜎
 
Agent type 𝑗’s date 𝑡 optimisation problem is: 
max
𝑘1,𝑗,𝑡+1,𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+2
𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡,𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1 
(𝑐1,𝑗,𝑡
𝛾(1 − 𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡)
1−𝛾
)
1−𝜎
1 − 𝜎
+ 𝛽
(𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1
𝛾(1 − 𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
1−𝛾
)
1−𝜎
1 − 𝜎
+ 𝛽2
(𝑐3,𝑗,𝑡+2
𝛾)
1−𝜎
1 − 𝜎
 
subject to budget constraints (1), (2) and (3), as well as to the non-negativity constraints for pension 
savings: 
𝑠1,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+1 ≥ 0 
𝑠2,𝑗,𝑡+1 = 𝑘3,𝑗,𝑡+2 − 𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+1(1 + 𝑟𝑡+2
𝑓 − 𝛿) ≥ 0 
This leads to four Euler equations. The first two Euler equations describe the individual's optimal 
labour-leisure choice in the two working-aged periods 𝑠 = 1,2: 
(1−𝜏𝑙
𝑗
)
(1+𝜏𝑐)
𝑤𝑗,𝑡 =
1−𝛾
𝛾
𝑐1,𝑗,𝑡
1−𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡
          (4) 
(1−𝜏𝑙
𝑗
)
(1+𝜏𝑐)
𝑤𝑗,𝑡+1 =
1−𝛾
𝛾
𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1
1−𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1
          (5) 
The second two Euler equations describe the individual's optimal consumption-savings choice in the 
two working-aged periods 𝑠 = 1,2. At each date, individuals weight the benefits between current 
and future consumption to find the optimal savings and capital stocks. For an interior solution (i.e. 
strictly positive savings in both periods, 𝑠1,𝑗,𝑡 > 0 and 𝑠2,𝑗,𝑡+1 > 0), the Euler equations for pension 
capital stocks are:  
1 = 𝛽 (
1−𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1
1−𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡
)
(1−𝛾)(1−𝜎)
(
𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1
𝑐1,𝑗,𝑡
)
𝛾(1−𝜎)−1
(1 + 𝑟𝑡+2 − 𝛿)      (6) 
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 1 = 𝛽 (
1
(1−𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
)
(1−𝛾)(1−𝜎)
(
𝑐3,𝑗,𝑡+2
𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1
)
𝛾(1−𝜎)−1
(1 + 𝑟𝑡+3 − 𝛿)
(1−0.75𝜏𝑙,𝑗,𝑟𝑒𝑡)
(1−𝜏𝑙
𝑗
)
    (7) 
In the model economies, we sometimes encountered corner solutions (no longer a trade-off 
between consumption), in which some types of individuals choose to set second period pension 
savings to zero. For a corner solution with 𝑠2,𝑗,𝑡+1 = 0, the pension savings Euler equations are: 
(1−𝜏𝑙
𝑗
)
(1+𝜏𝑐)
𝛾(1 − 𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡)
(1−𝛾)(1−𝜎)
(𝑐1,𝑗,𝑡)
𝛾(1−𝜎)−1
= 𝛽
(1−𝜏𝑙
𝑗
)
(1+𝜏𝑐)
𝛾 (𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
𝛾(1−𝜎)−1
(1 + 𝑟𝑡+2 − 𝛿) +
𝛽𝜇𝑗,𝑡+1(1 + 𝑟𝑡+2 − 𝛿)           (8) 
(1−𝜏𝑙
𝑗
)
(1+𝜏𝑐)
𝛾(𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
𝛾(1−𝜎)−1
(1 − 𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
(1−𝛾)(1−𝜎)
= 𝛽
(1−0.75𝜏𝑙,𝑗,𝑟𝑒𝑡)
(1+𝜏𝑐)
𝛾(𝑐3,𝑗,𝑡+2)
𝛾(1−𝜎)−1
∙
(1 + 𝑟𝑡+3 − 𝛿) − 𝜇𝑗,𝑡+1            (9) 
where 𝜇𝑗,𝑡+1 < 0 is a Lagrange multiplier and 𝑠2,𝑗,𝑡+1 = 𝑘3,𝑗,𝑡+2 − 𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+1(1 + 𝑟𝑡+2
𝑓 − 𝛿) = 0. 
(d) Taxed-Exempt-Exempt (TEE) – possible system 
Under the TEE regime with elastic labour supply, a young agent's budget constraint shows pension 
savings are made out of taxed income: 
𝑐1,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑠1,𝑗,𝑡  = 𝑤𝑗,𝑡𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡(1 − 𝜏𝑙
𝑗
) + 𝑇𝑗        (10)   
𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1 + 𝑠2,𝑗,𝑡+1 = 𝑤𝑗,𝑡+1𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1(1 − 𝜏𝑙
𝑗
) + 𝑇𝑗        (11) 
Agents own the capital stocks, which accumulate during their working life as: 
𝑘𝑠+1,𝑗,𝑡+1 = 𝑘𝑠,𝑗,𝑡(1 + 𝑟𝑡+1 − 𝛿) + 𝑠𝑠,𝑗,𝑡(1 + 𝜏𝑏) 
where 𝜏𝑏 is a 'top-up' or subsidy to long-term pension savings, of the kind which has been suggested 
by the PPI and mentioned as a possibility by HMT. In line with these proposals, we assume that 𝜏𝑏 is 
the same for all agents.  Agents begin life with zero capital 𝑘1,𝑗,𝑡 = 0. They also do not wish to leave 
any bequests, so 𝑘4,𝑗,𝑡+3 = 0.  
The pension capital stocks follow the accumulation equations: 
𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+1 = 𝑠1,𝑗,𝑡(1 + 𝜏𝑏) 
𝑘3,𝑗,𝑡+2 = 𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+1(1 + 𝑟𝑡+2 − 𝛿) + 𝑠2,𝑗,𝑡+1(1 + 𝜏𝑏) 
where 𝛿 is the period-to-period rate of depreciation of the capital stock. Agents are not allowed to 
draw down their pensions until retirement, so we impose the restriction that pension savings for the 
working aged must be non-negative: 𝑠1,𝑗,𝑡, 𝑠2,𝑗,𝑡+1 ≥ 0. Substituting out for savings in the working-
aged budget constraints for TEE with pension savings top-up rate 𝜏𝑏 becomes:  
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𝑐1,𝑗,𝑡 +
𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+1
1+𝜏𝑏
= 𝑤𝑗,𝑡(1 − 𝜏𝑙
𝑗
) + 𝑇𝑗        (10’)  
𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1 +
𝑘3,𝑗,𝑡+2−𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+1(1+𝑟𝑡+2−𝛿)
1+𝜏𝑏
= 𝑤𝑗,𝑡+1(1 − 𝜏𝑙
𝑗
) + 𝑇𝑗     (11’) 
In retirement, agents consume their accumulated pension and accessible capital stocks. Agents also 
receive a state pension of ?̃? each period, which is financed out of tax revenues.  The budget 
constraint for retirement periods ?̅? + 1,… ?̅? + 𝑛 = 𝑆 becomes: 
𝑐3,𝑗,𝑡+2 = (1 + 𝑟𝑡+3 − 𝛿)𝑘3,𝑗,𝑡+2 + ?̃?        (12) 
Since pension income is not taxable under TEE, the only taxable income is the state pension ?̃?. 
However, the full state pension lies below the personal allowance, so we assume that it is not taxed. 
To solve the individual’s problem, the agent chooses capital stocks 𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+1, 𝑘3,𝑗,𝑡+2 and labour 
supplies 𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡 , 𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1 to maximize: 
max
𝑘1,𝑗,𝑡+1,𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+2
𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡,𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1 
(𝑐1,𝑗,𝑡
𝛾(1 − 𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡)
1−𝛾
)
1−𝜎
1 − 𝜎
+ 𝛽
(𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1
𝛾(1 − 𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
1−𝛾
)
1−𝜎
1 − 𝜎
+ 𝛽2
(𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1
𝛾)
1−𝜎
1 − 𝜎
 
subject to the budget constraints (10), (11) and (12), and the non-negativity constraints on pension 
savings: 𝑠1,𝑗,𝑡 ≥ 0 and 𝑠2,𝑗,𝑡+1 = 𝑘3,𝑗,𝑡+2 − 𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+1(1 + 𝑟𝑡+2 − 𝛿) ≥ 0 
Solving this problem (Annexe 3) leads to four Euler equations. The first two Euler equations describe 
the individual's optimal labour-leisure choice in the working-aged periods 𝑠 = 1,2: 
(1−𝜏𝑙
𝑗
)
(1+𝜏𝑐)
𝑤𝑗,𝑡 =
1−𝛾
𝛾
𝑐1,𝑗,𝑡
1−𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡
          (13) 
(1−𝜏𝑙
𝑗
)
(1+𝜏𝑐)
𝑤𝑗,𝑡+1 =
1−𝛾
𝛾
𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1
1−𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1
         (14) 
The second two Euler equations describe the individual's optimal consumption-savings choice in the 
two working-aged periods 𝑠 = 1,2. At each date, individuals weight the benefits between current 
and future consumption to find the optimal savings and capital stocks. For an interior solution (i.e. 
strictly positive savings in both periods, 𝑠1,𝑗,𝑡 > 0 and 𝑠2,𝑗,𝑡+1 > 0), the Euler equations for pension 
capital stocks are: 
1 = 𝛽 (
1−𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1
1−𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡
)
(1−𝛾)(1−𝜎)
(
𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1
𝑐1,𝑗,𝑡
)
𝛾(1−𝜎)−1
(1 + 𝑟𝑡+2 − 𝛿)     (15) 
1 = 𝛽 (
𝑐3,𝑗,𝑡+2
𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1
)
𝛾(1−𝜎)−1
(
1
(1−𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
)
(1−𝛾)(1−𝜎)
(1 + 𝑟𝑡+3 − 𝛿)(1 + 𝜏𝑏)    (16) 
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In the TEE model economies, we sometimes encountered corner solutions, in which some types of 
individuals choose to set second period pension savings to zero. For a corner solution with 
𝑠2,𝑗,𝑡+1 = 0, the pension savings Euler equations are: 
𝛾
(1−𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
(1−𝛾)(1−𝜎)
(𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
𝛾(1−𝜎)−1
(1+𝜏𝑐)(1+𝜏𝑏)
= 𝛽𝛾
(𝑐3,𝑗,𝑡+2)
𝛾(1−𝜎)−1
(1+𝜏𝑐)
(1 + 𝑟𝑡+3 − 𝛿) − 𝜇𝑗,𝑡+1 (17) 
𝛾
(1 − 𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡)
(1−𝛾)(1−𝜎)
(𝑐1,𝑗,𝑡)
𝛾(1−𝜎)−1
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)(1 + 𝜏𝑏)
= 
𝛽 [𝛾
(1−𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
(1−𝛾)(1−𝜎)
(𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
𝛾(1−𝜎)−1
(1+𝜏𝑐)(1+𝜏𝑏)
+ 𝜇𝑗,𝑡+1] (1 + 𝑟𝑡+2 − 𝛿)  (18) 
where 𝑘3,𝑗,𝑡+2 = 𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+1(1 + 𝑟𝑡+2 − 𝛿) and 𝜇𝑗,𝑡+1 < 0 is the Lagrange multiplier.
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(e) Firms 
There is a unit measure of identical, perfectly competitive firms. Firms employ labour at wage 𝑤𝑡 
and capital at rental rate 𝑟𝑡+1. The firm's period 𝑡 problem is: 
max
𝐿𝑡,𝐾𝑡
𝐴𝑡(𝐿𝑡)
1−𝛼(𝐾𝑡)
𝛼 − 𝑟𝑡𝐾𝑡 − 𝑤𝑡𝐿𝑡
where labour 𝐿𝑡  is effective labour, weighted by agents’ productivities. 
𝑤𝑡𝐿𝑡 = ∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑡𝜋𝑗𝜌𝑗𝑙𝑠,𝑗,𝑡
𝑗=1,2,3𝑠=1,2
 
This leads to aggregate factor prices which are equal to their marginal products. 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝛼𝐴𝑡 (
𝐾𝑡
𝐿𝑡
)
𝛼−1
(19) 
𝑤𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼)𝐴𝑡 (
𝐾𝑡
𝐿𝑡
)
𝛼
(20) 
This implies that an individual with productivity 𝜌𝑗  has a wage rate 𝑤𝑗,𝑡 = 𝜌𝑗𝑤𝑡. 
(f) Government  
There is no government debt, so the government must run a balanced budget, financing state 
pension expenditures 𝐵𝑡 and other government expenditures 𝐺𝑡 out of current tax revenues. Under 
26
 The Lagrange multiplier on a constraint is the shadow value of the constraint, or a measure of how much 
utility agents would be willing to give up to loosen the constraint in question. 
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EET, tax revenues are raised on labour income net of pension savings, on 75% of retirement income, 
and from the consumption tax. This leads to the government budget constraint: 
𝐺𝑡 + 𝐵𝑡 = [∑ 𝜋𝑗 (
𝜏𝑙
𝑗
(𝑤𝑗,𝑡𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑠1,𝑗,𝑡) − 𝑇𝑗 + 𝜏𝑙
𝑗
(𝑤𝑗,𝑡𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑠2,𝑗,𝑡) − 𝑇𝑗
+0.75𝜏𝑙,𝑟𝑒𝑡
𝑗 𝑘3,𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑗,𝑟𝑒𝑡
)𝑗=1,2,3 ] + 𝜏𝐶𝐶𝑡    (21) 
Under TEE, tax revenues are composed of labour income tax revenues, net of the pension savings 
subsidy, and consumption tax revenues. The government's budget constraint is given by 
 ?̅? + ?̅? = [∑ 𝜋𝑗(𝜏𝑙
𝑗𝑤𝑗,𝑡𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑗 + 𝜏𝑙
𝑗𝑤𝑗,𝑡𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑗)𝑗=1,2,3 ] − 𝜏𝑏𝑆𝑡 + 𝜏𝑐𝐶𝑡    (22) 
Government expenditures are assumed to enter separably into agents' utility, so they do not show 
up in the optimisation problems.  
(g) Market Clearing 
There are three markets: goods, labour and capital. Market clearing conditions for labour and capital 
markets are  
𝐿𝑡 = ∑ ∑ 𝜋𝑗𝜌𝑗𝑙𝑠,𝑗,𝑡
2
𝑠=1𝑗=1,2,3 = ∑ 𝜋𝑗𝜌𝑗(𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑙𝑡,𝑗,2)𝑗=1,2,3      (23) 
𝐾𝑡 = ∑ ∑ 𝜋𝑗𝑘𝑠,𝑗,𝑡
3
𝑠=2𝑗=1,2,3 = ∑ 𝜋𝑗(𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑘3,𝑗,𝑡)𝑗=1,2,3       (24) 
Recalling that initial pension savings are zero, 𝑘1,𝑗,𝑡 = 0, and labour supply in retirement is also zero, 
𝑙𝑡,𝑗,3 = 0.  By Walras' law, the goods market clearing condition is redundant: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡 + 𝑆𝑡 + 𝐵𝑡 + 𝐺𝑡 
where 𝑆𝑡 is aggregate savings/investment, 𝐵𝑡 are aggregate pension payments, and 𝐺𝑡 is 
government spending.  
(h)  Equilibrium 
In an equilibrium, all household types choose pensions savings and labour supply optimally, firms 
maximize profits, the government balances its budget and markets clear.  
For each tax system (EET and TEE) there are twelve non-linear functional equations in the twelve 
variables ( 𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+1, 𝑘3,𝑗,𝑡+2, 𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡, 𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡)𝑗=1,2,3. We evaluate the twelve equations at the steady state 
and solve the system of non-linear equations using Matlab’s fsolve routine. 
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4. RESULTS 
Parameters are set in line with key data on the UK economy. Productivities are set so that labour 
earnings of the three agent types match those of the average basic rate, higher rate and additional 
rate taxpayer. Shares of agent types in the economy also match the shares of working-aged 
taxpayers in each tax band.  Setting the state pension to 20% of the average labour earnings is 
equivalent to setting it to £116 weekly, roughly in line with state pension rates. The weight on 
leisure is chosen so that agents work approximately 1/3 of their time. Period length is 20 years. The 
other parameters are entirely standard and usual values used in the applied economics literature. 
Parameter Description Value 
𝜎 Consumption smoothing 1.5 
𝛾 Weight on leisure 0.36 
𝛽 Discount factor, 0.99 annually 0. 9920 
𝐴 Technology level, normalize 2 
𝛼 Capital share of income 36% 
𝛿 Depreciation rate, ≈0.10 annually 0.90 
(𝜌1, 𝜌2, 𝜌3) Productivities   (0.727, 1.797, 8.553) 
(𝜋1, 𝜋2, 𝜋3) Shares of agents in economy (0.784, 0.201, 0.015) 
𝜏𝑐 Consumption + excise tax rate 0.33 
?̃? State pension 20% ∙ 𝑤𝑙 ̅
(a) Headline aggregate results 
The macroeconomic results from the simulation exercise are shown in Table 4a and 4b and 
illustrated in Figure 4a. The first vertical column shows the variable of interest (cited in Section 3) 
and column 2 shows the model results under the current EET system. The steady state values are 
well within expected levels. The next six columns show the variable outcomes for the TEE taxation 
system under different scenarios for the pension subsidy (to compensate for pension illiquidity). 
Comparing the two tax systems is easiest in Table 4b where the EET values have been standardised 
at 100, therefore the difference with the TEE variables are percentage variation. 
Moving from EET to TEE leads to declines in aggregate GDP, investment (savings), productivity and 
real wages, and to an increase in the real interest rate up to a pension subsidy of 50%. Aggregate 
consumption also falls in all the TEE cases, except for the most generous pension tax subsidy of 50%. 
These are strong results and consistent with most of the findings cited in the literature review in 
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Section 2. We note that for a subsidy of 20% the decline in consumption is 6% and this is without the 
impact of inferior risk sharing properties of EET or the possible substitution into other TEE assets 
such as housing. While the government function has been set up to have no impact on debt 
issuance, the higher real interest rate would result in higher interest payments on government debt. 
The intuition for the results is that the shift from EET to TEE shifts the tax burden to working-aged 
agents, reducing the after-tax income that they can allocate between consumption and savings. As a 
result, both consumption and savings fall. The lower saving reduces the amount of investment and 
results in a smaller steady state capital stock. The fall in the capital to labour ratio implies a higher 
real interest rate, lower labour productivity and a lower real wage rate. 
An income effect would induce agents to increase labour supply, to recoup some of the income lost 
due to the tax changes. However, the fall in real wages also causes the price of leisure to fall, 
depressing labour supply by the substitution effect. In the aggregate, the income and substitution 
effects are roughly equal leading to little change in the labour supply. However, as we see below, the 
labour supply response by each cohort is markedly different. 
(b) Intergenerational effects 
In the model, agents wish to front-load their savings into the first part of their working life, in order 
to benefit from the ‘accumulation effect’. That is, agents recognise that a given amount of savings 
made as a younger working aged person makes a greater contribution to future pension income 
than the same amount of savings made as an older working aged person. The desire to front-load 
savings, coupled with the desire to smooth consumption over the lifetime, makes the agents’ budget 
constraints particularly tight whilst younger working-aged. That is, all other things equal, the shadow 
value of increasing income is higher for the young working aged.  
Shifting from EET to TEE front-loads the income tax burden, away from retirees and especially onto 
younger working aged agents, taking income away from younger agents just at the point when their 
budget constraint is tightest. The impact of moving to TEE on after-tax incomes, labour supply and 
saving is illustrated in Figure 4b and Tables 4c and 4d respectively. Younger agents compensate for 
this withdrawal of resources to some extent by increasing their labour supply, despite a lower wage 
(Figure 4c).The saving of working aged agents drops strongly (Figure 4d) for three reasons:  
1) The greater tax burden in the first period of working life means that these working aged 
agents have less after-tax income to allocate between consumption and savings, so they save less. 
2) The lack of taxation when old means that agents can save less than under EET in order to 
achieve the same retirement consumption.  
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3) The higher interest rate under TEE means that agents need to save less than under EET to 
achieve the same retirement capital stock, reducing savings.  
Consumption patterns also shift. Agents consume less while working and (relatively) more when 
retired (Tables 4c and 4d). When the TEE subsidy to pension savings reaches 40%, consumption in 
retirement rises in absolute terms compared to EET. However, lifetime consumption still declines, as 
the increase in retirement consumption is outweighed by working aged declines. Moreover, the 
increases in retirement consumption are almost exclusively due to increases in retirement 
consumption by the richest 1.5%, with retirement consumption dropping for basic and higher rate 
taxpayers in all but the (unrealistic) 50% tax subsidy case (Tables 4e and 4f).    
(c) Distributional consequences of the shift to TEE 
While the TEE system does shift some income tax burden from basic and higher rate taxpayers onto 
the highest earning additional rate taxpayers, it does so at the cost of reducing lifetime consumption 
for lower earning basic rate and higher rate taxpayers for all but the most generous tax-subsidy TEE 
case. If the subsidy to pension savings is 20%, then the basic rate taxpayer’s lifetime consumption 
falls to 95.6% of its EET level. Additional rate taxpayers are also made worse off, with the exception 
of the scenarios in which the subsidy to pension savings is 40% or greater. Savings drop most for the 
highest earners, and least for the lowest earning basic rate taxpayer. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
The Government consultation paper (HMT cm9102) sets out four principles that reform of pension 
taxation should meet, as well as being mindful of the macroeconomic consequences (in particular on 
long-term investment and financial markets). Reforms must be: 
 simple and transparent; 
 allow individuals to take personal responsibility; 
 build on the success of auto-enrolment and encourage new people to save more; 
 be sustainable and in line with the Government’s long term fiscal strategy. 
 We have presented conceptual, empirical and modelling evidence to assess whether the proposal of 
changing the taxation of pensions from the current EET system to TEE (plus a government subsidy) is 
likely to meet these principles. We created a general equilibrium OLG model with parameter values 
matching the UK economy to test the evidence from the literature within a UK context. 
In a country with a progressive taxation system and a flexible labour supply EET will, in general, 
result in higher pension saving. While there is some offset in other forms of saving, personal saving is 
found to be higher under EET. These findings are supported by our modelling analysis. Personal 
savings and output were lower under a TEE system in all reasonable scenarios of subsidies. Even 
with a 20% pension subsidy output is estimated to be 9% lower under TEE when all transitions are 
complete. Our distribution analysis suggests the consequences are greatest for younger cohorts. 
The EET has superior risk sharing properties and higher saving leads to more investment in equities 
and long-term debt. As well as providing greater funding for higher risk investment, deeper and 
longer-term capital markets and improved pension fund governance have been found to lead to 
improvements in productivity. Our modelling analysis shows lower investment and productivity 
under a TEE pension taxation system than the status quo. Higher real interest rates under TEE would 
lead to higher funding costs for the Government.  
By changing the taxation of pensions to TEE, the tax treatment will be similar to ISAs and housing 
wealth, but much less liquid. There is a risk of considerable substitution into other TEE savings, in 
particular housing. This can only be offset by a significant subsidy to encourage pension saving. 
There is a dynamic inconsistency problem inherent in TEE because a future government can always 
reverse policy and remove the subsidy, or re-introduce taxation on pension income. Given the 
pension challenges ahead, a government cannot credibly commit not to exploit this time 
inconsistency. Given the inferior risk sharing and credible commitment problem, individuals are less, 
rather than more, able to take personal responsibility.  
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Table 4a: EET vs TEE - Aggregate variables, levels  
  Variable EET TEE 
   𝜏𝑏 = 0% 𝜏𝑏 = 10% 𝜏𝑏 = 20% 𝜏𝑏 = 30% 𝜏𝑏 = 40% 𝜏𝑏 = 50% 
𝑌 1.096 0.936 0.967 0.997 1.032 1.058 1.081 
𝐾 0.309 0.203 0.223 0.243 0.266 0.282 0.298 
𝐼 0.208 0.119 0.134 0.150 0.173 0.186 0.199 
𝐶 0.574 0.511 0.525 0.539 0.551 0.565 0.579 
L 0.703 0.697 0.697 0.696 0.696 0.700 0.703 
𝑌/𝐿 1.558 1.343 1.388 1.432 1.483 1.512 1.539 
𝑤 0.927 0.801 0.828 0.854 0.881 0.899 0.915 
𝑟 annual 1.6% 2.9% 2.6% 2.3% 2.0% 1.9% 1.7% 
𝑇 0.314 0.306 0.307 0.308 0.308 0.307 0.304 
Where Y = output, K = capital stock, I = investment, C = consumption, L = labour supply, Y / L = 
productivity, w = real wage rate, r is the annual interest rate and T is aggregate tax revenues. 
Table 4b: EET vs TEE - Aggregate variables, % of EET levels  
Variable EET TEE 
   𝜏𝑏 = 0% 𝜏𝑏 = 10% 𝜏𝑏 = 20% 𝜏𝑏 = 30% 𝜏𝑏 = 40% 𝜏𝑏 = 50% 
𝑌 100.0 85.4 88.2 91.0 94.2 96.5 98.6 
𝐾 100.0 65.7 72.2 78.6 86.1 91.3 96.4 
𝐼 100.0 57.2 64.4 72.1 83.2 89.4 95.7 
𝐶 100.0 89.0 91.5 93.9 96.0 98.4 100.9 
L 100.0 99.1 99.1 99.0 99.0 99.6 100.0 
𝑌/𝐿 100.0 86.2 89.1 91.9 95.2 97.0 98.8 
𝑤 100.0 86.4 89.3 92.1 95.0 97.0 98.7 
𝑟 annual 1.6% 2.9% 2.6% 2.3% 2.0% 1.9% 1.7% 
𝑇 100.0 97.5 97.8 98.1 98.1 97.8 96.8 
𝑇1 100.0 176.6 166.0 154.3 140.4 125.5 112.8 
𝑇2 100.0 94.7 98.2 101.6 105.3 107.0 105.3 
𝑇3 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
𝑇𝐶  100.0 89.4 91.5 94.2 96.3 98.9 101.1 
𝑇 are aggregate tax revenues,  𝑇1 are the tax revenues collected from the younger cohort of working 
aged agents, 𝑇2 from the middle cohort of the older working aged, and 𝑇3 from pensioners. 𝑇𝐶  are 
the tax revenues from consumption and excise taxes. The top panel presents the results in units of 
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the consumption good. The bottom panel presents results for TEE as a percentage of the 
corresponding EET equilibrium value, with the exception of the annual interest rate.  
 
Table 4c: EET vs TEE - Cohort analysis, levels  
Variable EET TEE 
   𝜏𝑏 = 0% 𝜏𝑏 = 10% 𝜏𝑏 = 20% 𝜏𝑏 = 30% 𝜏𝑏 = 40% 𝜏𝑏 = 50% 
𝑤 0.927 0.801 0.828 0.854 0.881 0.899 0.915 
𝐿1 0.377 0.391 0.391 0.391 0.392 0.387 0.382 
𝐿2 0.326 0.305 0.305 0.305 0.304 0.313 0.321 
𝑤𝐿1 0.376 0.337 0.349 0.359 0.371 0.373 0.375 
𝑤𝐿2 0.326 0.262 0.270 0.279 0.290 0.304 0.317 
𝑆1 0.115 0.074 0.076 0.078 0.081 0.078 0.075 
𝑆2 0.036 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.010 0.018 
𝐶1 0.161 0.136 0.141 0.145 0.150 0.154 0.158 
𝐶2 0.175 0.156 0.161 0.166 0.171 0.172 0.174 
𝐶3 0.238 0.219 0.224 0.228 0.230 0.239 0.248 
𝑇1 0.047 0.083 0.078 0.073 0.066 0.059 0.053 
𝑇2 0.057 0.054 0.056 0.058 0.060 0.061 0.060 
𝑇3 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Table 4d: EET vs TEE - Cohort analysis, % of EET levels  
Variable EET TEE 
   𝜏𝑏 = 0% 𝜏𝑏 = 10% 𝜏𝑏 = 20% 𝜏𝑏 = 30% 𝜏𝑏 = 40% 𝜏𝑏 = 50% 
𝑤 100.0 86.4 89.3 92.1 95.0 97.0 98.7 
𝐿1 100.0 103.7 103.7 103.7 104.0 102.7 101.3 
𝐿2 100.0 93.6 93.6 93.6 93.3 96.0 98.5 
𝑤𝐿1 100.0 89.6 92.8 95.5 98.7 99.2 99.7 
𝑤𝐿2 100.0 80.4 82.8 85.6 89.0 93.3 97.2 
𝑆1 100.0 64.3 66.1 67.8 70.4 67.8 65.2 
𝑆2 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.8 27.8 50.0 
𝐶1 100.0 84.5 87.6 90.1 93.2 95.7 98.1 
𝐶2 100.0 89.1 92.0 94.9 97.7 98.3 99.4 
𝐶3 100.0 92.0 94.1 95.8 96.6 100.4 104.2 
𝑇1 100.0 176.6 166.0 155.3 140.4 125.5 112.8 
𝑇2 100.0 94.7 98.2 101.8 105.3 107.0 105.3 
𝑇3 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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Cohort 1 is younger working aged, cohort 2 is older working aged and cohort 3 is retirement. . The top panel presents the 
results in units of the consumption good. The bottom panel presents results for TEE as a percentage of the corresponding 
EET equilibrium value, with the exception of the annual interest rate. 
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Table 4e: EET vs TEE - Distributional analysis, levels  
Variable EET TEE 
   𝜏𝑏 = 0% 𝜏𝑏 = 10% 𝜏𝑏 = 20% 𝜏𝑏 = 30% 𝜏𝑏 = 40% 𝜏𝑏 = 50% 
𝐿𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐 0.700 0.695 0.695 0.695 0.693 0.696 0.699 
𝐿ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 0.709 0.697 0.697 0.697 0.704 0.708 0.710 
𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑙  0.788 0.779 0.779 0.779 0.785 0.788 0.790 
𝑆𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐 0.095 0.052 0.054 0.055 0.056 0.060 0.063 
𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 0.278 0.122 0.126 0.130 0.145 0.153 0.161 
𝑆𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑙  1.361 0.567 0.587 0.606 0.661 0.696 0.726 
𝐶𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐 0.433 0.384 0.395 0.405 0.414 0.425 0.435 
𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 0.904 0.804 0.827 0.848 0.864 0.887 0.909 
𝐶𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑙  3.538 3.236 3.326 3.410 3.499 3.592 3.681 
𝑇𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐 0.0755 0.049 0.046 0.043 0.040 0.036 0.031 
𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 0.0676 0.054 0.054 0.053 0.052 0.050 0.047 
𝑇𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑙  0.0324 0.034 0.034 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.034 
 
Table 4f: EET vs TEE - Distributional analysis, % of EET levels  
Variable EET TEE 
   𝜏𝑏 = 0% 𝜏𝑏 = 10% 𝜏𝑏 = 20% 𝜏𝑏 = 30% 𝜏𝑏 = 40% 𝜏𝑏 = 50% 
𝐿𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐 100.0 99.3 99.3 99.3 99.0 99.4 99.9 
𝐿ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 100.0 98.3 98.3 98.3 99.3 99.9 100.1 
𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑙  100.0 98.9 98.9 98.9 99.6 100.0 100.3 
𝑆𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐 100.0 54.7 56.8 57.9 58.9 63.2 66.3 
𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 100.0 43.9 45.3 46.8 52.2 55.0 57.9 
𝑆𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑙  100.0 41.7 43.1 44.5 48.6 51.1 53.3 
𝐶𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐 100.0 88.7 91.2 93.5 95.6 98.2 100.5 
𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 100.0 88.9 91.5 93.8 95.6 98.1 100.6 
𝐶𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑙  100.0 91.5 94.0 96.4 98.9 101.5 104.0 
𝑇𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐 100.0 64.9 60.9 57.0 53.0 47.7 41.1 
𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 100.0 79.9 79.9 78.4 76.9 74.0 69.5 
𝑇𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑙  100.0 104.9 104.9 108.0 108.0 108.0 104.9 
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Figure 4a: Key macroeconomy aggregates 
 
Key macroeconomics aggregates under TEE, with varying TEE pension subsidy rates 𝜏𝑏. All values are 
expressed relative to the corresponding EET outcome, with EET outcomes normalised to 100. For 
example, output under TEE with a pension subsidy of 20% drops to 91% of its EET level. 
 
Figure 4b: After tax incomes by cohort 
After-tax incomes under TEE, with varying TEE pension subsidy rates 𝜏𝑏. All values are expressed 
relative to the corresponding EET outcome, with EET outcomes normalised to 100.   
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Figure 4c: Labour supply by cohort 
 Labour supply under TEE, with varying TEE pension subsidy rates 𝜏𝑏. All values are expressed 
relative to the corresponding EET outcome, with EET outcomes normalised to 100.  
Figure 4d: Private savings by cohort 
 
Savings under TEE, with varying TEE pension subsidy rates τb. All values are expressed relative to the 
corresponding EET outcome, with EET outcomes normalised to 100. 
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ANNEX 1: DERIVING THE TAX FUNCTION FOR THE UK TAX SYSTEM UNDER EET PENSION TAX RELIEF 
Under the EET regime, pension savings 𝑠𝑠,𝑗,𝑡 can be deducted from taxable income. As a result, the 
basic rate taxpayer has tax function: 
𝑇1 = 𝑇(𝑤1,𝑡𝑙𝑠,1,𝑡, 𝑠𝑠,1,𝑡) = 𝜏𝑙,1(𝑤𝑡𝑙𝑠,1,𝑡 − 𝑠𝑠,1,𝑡 − ?̅?1) 
where  ?̅?1 is the lower income threshold for income tax of £10,600 and 𝜏𝑙,1 = 20% + 12% = 32% is 
the combined income tax and NI rate in the basic rate income band.27  
The higher rate tax payer pays the basic rate on income in the basic rate band, and higher rate on 
income in excess of the higher rate threshold of ?̅?2 = £42,465, giving her the tax function: 
𝑇2 = 𝑇(𝑤2,𝑡𝑙𝑠,2,𝑡, 𝑠𝑠,2,𝑡) = 𝜏𝑙,1(𝑤2,𝑡𝑙𝑠,2,𝑡 − 𝑠𝑠,2,𝑡 − ?̅?1) + 𝜏𝑙,2(𝑤2,𝑡𝑙𝑠,2,𝑡 − 𝑠𝑠,2,𝑡 − ?̅?2) 
where 𝜏𝑙,2 is the combined NI and income tax rate in excess of the basic rate, so that. 𝜏𝑙,2 = 40% +
2% − 𝜏𝑙,1 = 10%.  
 The additional rate taxpayer pays 47% (45% income tax + 2% NI) on income in excess of the 
additional rate threshold of ?̅?3 = £150,000.  As a result, the additional rate taxpayer’s tax liabilities 
are described by  
𝑇3 = 𝑇(𝑤3,𝑡𝑙𝑠,3,𝑡, 𝑠𝑠,3,𝑡)
= 𝜏𝑙,1(𝑤3,𝑡𝑙𝑠,3,𝑡 − 𝑠𝑠,3,𝑡) + 𝜏𝑙,2(𝑤3,𝑡𝑙𝑠,3,𝑡 − 𝑠𝑠,3,𝑡 − ?̅?2
∗)
+ 𝜏𝑙,3(𝑤3,𝑡𝑙𝑠,3,𝑡 − 𝑠𝑠,3,𝑡 − ?̅?3) 
where 𝜏𝑙,3 = 5% and ?̅?2
∗ = £31,785 and ?̅?3 = £150,000. The reason for the lower 'higher rate' 
threshold is that tax-free personal allowance is phased out beginning at incomes of £100,000.  
A general form for the tax function is: 
𝑇𝑗 = 𝑇(𝑤𝑗,𝑡𝑙𝑠,𝑗,𝑡, 𝑠𝑠,𝑗,𝑡)
= 𝜏𝑙,1𝑚𝑎𝑥{0,𝑤𝑗,𝑡𝑙𝑠,𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑠𝑠,3,𝑡 − ?̅?1} + 𝜏𝑙,2𝑚𝑎𝑥{0,𝑤𝑗,𝑡𝑙𝑠,𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑠𝑠,𝑗,𝑡 − ?̅?2}
+ 𝜏𝑙,3𝑚𝑎𝑥{0,𝑤𝑗,𝑡𝑙𝑠,𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑠𝑠,𝑗,𝑡 − ?̅?3} 
As a result, the basic rate working-aged agent’s budget constraints becomes: 
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)𝑐𝑠,1,𝑡 + (1 − 𝜏𝑙,1)𝑠𝑠,1,𝑡 = (1 − 𝜏𝑙,1)𝑤𝑗,𝑡𝑙𝑠,1,𝑡 + 𝜏𝑙,1?̅?1 
The higher rate working–aged agent’s budget constraint is: 
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)𝑐𝑠,2,𝑡 + (1 − 𝜏𝑙,1 − 𝜏𝑙,2)𝑠𝑠,2,𝑡 = (1 − 𝜏𝑙,1 − 𝜏𝑙,2)𝑤2,𝑡𝑙𝑠,2,𝑡 + 𝜏𝑙,1?̅?1 + 𝜏𝑙,2?̅?2 
                                                     
27
 The actual lower earnings threshold for National Insurance is slightly lower than £10,600.   
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Finally, the additional rate taxpayer’s budget constraint is: 
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)𝑐𝑠,3,𝑡 + (1 − 𝜏𝑙,1 − 𝜏𝑙,2 − 𝜏𝑙,3)𝑠𝑠,3,𝑡
= (1 − 𝜏𝑙,1 − 𝜏𝑙,2 − 𝜏𝑙,3)𝑤3,𝑡𝑙𝑠,3,𝑡 + 𝜏𝑙,1?̅?1 + 𝜏𝑙,2?̅?2 + 𝜏𝑙,3?̅?3 
To account for the withdrawal of the personal allowance for additional rate taxpayers, we could 
exclude the 𝜏𝑙,1?̅?1 term.  
𝑇𝑗 = {
𝜏𝑙,1?̅?1  𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝜏𝑙,1?̅?1 + 𝜏𝑙,2?̅?2   ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝜏𝑙,2?̅?2 + 𝜏𝑙,3?̅?3   𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
 
Taxpayer type Agent type 
𝒋 
Marginal tax rate 𝝉𝒍
𝒋
  (working 
age) 
Lump-sum 𝑻𝒋 
Basic rate 1 32% 𝜏𝑙,1?̅?1 
Higher rate 2 42% 𝜏𝑙,1?̅?1 + 𝜏𝑙,2?̅?2 
Additional 
rate 
3 47% 𝜏𝑙,2?̅?2
∗ + 𝜏𝑙,3?̅?3 
Marginal tax rates are given as: 
𝜏𝑙
𝑗 = {
𝜏𝑙,1 = 32%
𝜏𝑙,1 + 𝜏𝑙,2 = 42%
𝜏𝑙,1 + 𝜏𝑙,2 + 𝜏𝑙,3 = 47%
 
where (𝜏𝑙,1, 𝜏𝑙,2, 𝜏𝑙,3) = (32%, 10%, 5%) and the lump-sum reimbursements are given by: 
𝑇𝑗 = {
?̅?1𝜏𝑙,1
?̅?1𝜏𝑙,1 + ?̅?2𝜏𝑙,2
?̅?2𝜏𝑙,2 + ?̅?3𝜏𝑙,3
 
Each ?̅?𝑗  represents the threshold at which its tax band begins: 
(?̅?1, ?̅?2, ?̅?3) = (10600, 41,765, 150,000). 
Substituting out for savings, working-age budget constraints become:  
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)𝑐1,𝑗,𝑡 = (1 − 𝜏𝑙
𝑗
)𝑤𝑗,𝑡𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡 − (1 − 𝜏𝑙
𝑗
)𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+1
𝑓 + 𝑇𝑗    (1) 
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡 = (1 − 𝜏𝑙
𝑗
)𝑤𝑗,𝑡+2𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1 − (1 − 𝜏𝑙
𝑗
)[𝑘3,𝑗,𝑡+2
𝑓 − 𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+1
𝑓
(1 + 𝑟𝑡+2
𝑓 − 𝛿)] + 𝑇𝑗  (2)  
In retirement period 3, all accumulated savings and the state pension (financed out of tax revenues) 
are consumed. 25% of pension savings are tax-free, while the remainder is taxed as income. All 
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accessible savings may be consumed tax-free. Agents also receive a fixed state pension ?̃? which is 
low enough not to be taxed.  This leaves the retirement budget constraint as: 
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)𝑐3,𝑗,𝑡+2 = (1 + 𝑟𝑡+3 − 𝛿)𝑘3,𝑗,𝑡+2
𝑓
(1 − 𝜏𝑙,𝑗,𝑟𝑒𝑡0.75) + ?̃? + 𝑇𝑗,𝑟𝑒𝑡     (3)  
where once again 𝑇𝑗,𝑟𝑒𝑡 is the lump sum refund of personal allowance at agent 𝑗’s retirement tax 
band, and 𝜏𝑙,𝑗,𝑟𝑒𝑡 is the marginal tax rate in retirement for agent type 𝑗.  
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ANNEX 2: SOLVING THE INDIVIDUAL'S OPTIMISATION PROBLEM, EET 
Under EET, agent type 𝑗’s date 𝑡 optimisation problem is: 
max
𝑘,𝑙
(𝑐1,𝑗,𝑡
𝛾(1 − 𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡)
1−𝛾
)
1−𝜎
1 − 𝜎
+ 𝛽
(𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1
𝛾(1 − 𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
1−𝛾
)
1−𝜎
1 − 𝜎
+ 𝛽2
(𝑐3,𝑗,𝑡+2
𝛾)
1−𝜎
1 − 𝜎
subject to budget constraints 
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)𝑐1,𝑗,𝑡 = (1 − 𝜏𝑙
𝑗
)𝑤𝑗,𝑡𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡 − (1 − 𝜏𝑙
𝑗
)𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+1 + 𝑇𝑗 (1) 
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡 = (1 − 𝜏𝑙
𝑗
)𝑤𝑗,𝑡+2𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1 − (1 − 𝜏𝑙
𝑗
)[𝑘3,𝑗,𝑡+2 − 𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+1(1 + 𝑟𝑡+2
𝑓 − 𝛿)] + 𝑇𝑗   (2) 
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)𝑐3,𝑗,𝑡+2 = (1 + 𝑟𝑡+3 − 𝛿)𝑘3,𝑗,𝑡+2(1 − 𝜏𝑙,𝑗,𝑟𝑒𝑡0.75) + ?̃?(1 − 𝜏𝑙,𝑗,𝑟𝑒𝑡) + 𝑇𝑗,𝑟𝑒𝑡 (3) 
as well as to the non-negativity constraints for accessible capital stocks and pension savings: 
𝑠1,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+1 ≥ 0 
𝑠2,𝑗,𝑡+1 = 𝑘3,𝑗,𝑡+2 − 𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+1(1 + 𝑟𝑡+2 − 𝛿) ≥ 0 
The Lagrangian is: 
𝐿
=
[(
(1 − 𝜏𝑙
𝑗
)𝑤𝑗,𝑡𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡 − (1 − 𝜏𝑙
𝑗
)𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+1 + 𝑇𝑗
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)
)
𝛾
(1 − 𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡)
1−𝛾
]
1−𝜎
1 − 𝜎
+ 𝛽 [
(
(1 − 𝜏𝑙
𝑗
)𝑤𝑗,𝑡𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1 + (1 − 𝜏𝑙
𝑗
) (𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+1(1 + 𝑟𝑡+2 − 𝛿)) − (1 − 𝜏𝑙
𝑗
)𝑘3,𝑗,𝑡+2
+𝑇𝑗
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)
)
𝛾
(1 − 𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
1−𝛾
]
1−𝜎
1 − 𝜎
+ 𝛽2
[
(1 + 𝑟𝑡+3 − 𝛿)𝑘3,𝑗,𝑡+2(1 − 𝜏𝑙,𝑗,𝑟𝑒𝑡0.75) + 𝑇𝑗,𝑟𝑒𝑡 + ?̃?
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)
]
𝛾(1−𝜎)
1 − 𝜎
− 𝜆𝑗,𝑡𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+1
− 𝜇𝑗,𝑡+1𝛽 (𝑘3,𝑗,𝑡+2−𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+1(1 + 𝑟𝑡+2 − 𝛿)) 
with accompanying complementary slackness conditions: 
 𝜇𝑗,𝑡+1 ≤ 0 
𝑘3,𝑗,𝑡+2−𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+1(1 + 𝑟𝑡+2 − 𝛿) ≥ 0 
 𝜇𝑗,𝑡+1 (𝑘3,𝑗,𝑡+2−𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+1(1 + 𝑟𝑡+2 − 𝛿)) = 0 
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 𝜆𝑗,𝑡+1 ≤ 0 
𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+1 ≥ 0 
 𝜆𝑗,𝑡+1𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+1 = 0 
First order conditions for labour supply (labour-leisure choice) for each 𝑗. 
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1
= 𝛽 [(𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
𝛾
(1 − 𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
1−𝛾
]
−𝜎
[(1 − 𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
1−𝛾
𝛾(𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
𝛾−1 (1 − 𝜏𝑙
𝑗
)
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)
𝑤𝑗,𝑡
− (𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
𝛾
(1 − 𝛾)(1 − 𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
−𝛾
] = 0 
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡
= [(𝑐1,𝑗,𝑡)
𝛾
(1 − 𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡)
1−𝛾
]
−𝜎
[(1 − 𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡)
1−𝛾
𝛾(𝑐1,𝑗,𝑡)
𝛾−1 (1 − 𝜏𝑙
𝑗
)
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)
𝑤𝑗,𝑡
− (𝑐1,𝑗,𝑡)
𝛾
(1 − 𝛾)(1 − 𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡)
−𝛾
] = 0 
This leads to two labour-leisure Euler equations. 
(1 − 𝜏𝑙
𝑗
)
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)
𝑤𝑗,𝑡 =
1 − 𝛾
𝛾
𝑐1,𝑗,𝑡
1 − 𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡
 
(1 − 𝜏𝑙
𝑗
)
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)
𝑤𝑗,𝑡+1 =
1 − 𝛾
𝛾
𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1
1 − 𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1
 
First order conditions for pension capital stocks (consumption-savings choice): 
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+1
= −
(1 − 𝜏𝑙
𝑗
)
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)
(1 − 𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡)
1−𝛾
𝛾(𝑐1,𝑗,𝑡)
𝛾−1
((𝑐1,𝑗,𝑡)
𝛾
(1 − 𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡)
1−𝛾
)
−𝜎
+ 𝛽(1 − 𝑙2,𝑡+1)
1−𝛾
𝛾(𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
𝛾−1
((𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
𝛾
(1 − 𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
1−𝛾
)
−𝜎 (1 − 𝜏𝑙
𝑗
)
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)
(1
+ 𝑟𝑡+2 − 𝛿) − 𝜆𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽𝜇𝑗,𝑡+1(1 + 𝑟𝑡+2 − 𝛿) = 0 
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑘3,𝑗,𝑡+2
= −𝛽
(1 − 𝜏𝑙
𝑗
)
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)
(1 − 𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
1−𝛾
𝛾(𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
𝛾−1
((𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
𝛾
(1 − 𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
1−𝛾
)
−𝜎
+ 𝛽2𝛾(𝑐3,𝑗,𝑡+2)
𝛾(1−𝜎)−1
(1 + 𝑟𝑡+3 − 𝛿)
(1 − 0.75𝜏𝑙
𝑗
)
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)
− 𝛽𝜇𝑗,𝑡+1 = 0 
This leads to two Euler conditions for an interior solution for pension savings: 
1 = 𝛽 ((
𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1
𝑐1,𝑗,𝑡
)
𝛾
(
1 − 𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1
1 − 𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡
)
1−𝛾
)
1−𝜎
(
𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1
𝑐1,𝑗,𝑡
)
−1
(1 + 𝑟𝑡+2 − 𝛿) 
42 
 
1 = 𝛽 (
1
(1 − 𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
)
(1−𝛾)(1−𝜎)
(
𝑐3,𝑗,𝑡+2
𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1
)
𝛾(1−𝜎)−1
(1 + 𝑟𝑡+3 − 𝛿)
(1 − 0.75𝜏𝑙,𝑗,𝑟𝑒𝑡)
(1 − 𝜏𝑙
𝑗
)
 
For a corner solution with 𝑠2,𝑗,𝑡+1 = 0 and 𝜇𝑗,𝑡+1 < 0, the pension savings Euler equations are: 
(1 − 𝜏𝑙
𝑗
)
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)
𝛾 ((𝑐1,𝑗,𝑡)
𝛾
(1 − 𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡)
1−𝛾
)
1−𝜎
(𝑐1,𝑗,𝑡)
−1
= 𝛽𝛾 ((𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
𝛾
(1 − 𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
1−𝛾
)
1−𝜎
(𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
−1 (1 − 𝜏𝑙
𝑗
)
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)
(1 + 𝑟𝑡+2 − 𝛿)
+ 𝛽𝜇𝑗,𝑡+1(1 + 𝑟𝑡+2 − 𝛿) 
(1 − 𝜏𝑙
𝑗
)
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)
𝛾(𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
−1
((𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
𝛾
(1 − 𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
1−𝛾
)
1−𝜎
= 𝛽𝛾(𝑐3,𝑗,𝑡+2)
𝛾(1−𝜎)−1
∙ (1 + 𝑟𝑡+3 − 𝛿)
(1 − 0.75𝜏𝑙,𝑗,𝑟𝑒𝑡)
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)
− 𝜇𝑗,𝑡+1 
and in addition  𝑠2,𝑗,𝑡+1 = 𝑘3,𝑗,𝑡+2−𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+1(1 + 𝑟𝑡+2 − 𝛿) = 0. 
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ANNEX 3: SOLVING THE INDIVIDUAL'S PROBLEM, TEE 
Under TEE, the individual chooses capital stocks 𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+1, 𝑘3,𝑗,𝑡+2 and labour supplies 𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡 , 𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1 
to maximize: 
max
𝑘1,𝑗,𝑡+1,𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+2
𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡,𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1 
(𝑐1,𝑗,𝑡
𝛾(1 − 𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡)
1−𝛾
)
1−𝜎
1 − 𝜎
+ 𝛽
(𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1
𝛾(1 − 𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
1−𝛾
)
1−𝜎
1 − 𝜎
+ 𝛽2
(𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1
𝛾)
1−𝜎
1 − 𝜎
 
subject to the budget constraints (10), (11) and (12), and the non-negativity constraints on pension 
savings: 𝑠1,𝑗,𝑡 ≥ 0 and 𝑠2,𝑗,𝑡+1 = 𝑘3,𝑗,𝑡+2 − 𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+1(1 + 𝑟𝑡+2 − 𝛿) ≥ 0 
The Lagrangian is: 
𝐿
=
[(𝑤𝑗,𝑡𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡
(1 − 𝜏𝑙
𝑗
)
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)
−
𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+1
(1 + 𝜏𝑏)(1 + 𝜏𝑐)
+
𝑇𝑗
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)
)
𝛾
(1 − 𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡)
1−𝛾
]
1−𝜎
1 − 𝜎
+ 𝛽 (
 
 
(
 
 𝑤𝑗,𝑡+1𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1
(1 − 𝜏𝑙
𝑗
)
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)
−
𝑘3,𝑗,𝑡+2 − 𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+1(1 + 𝑟𝑡+2 − 𝛿)
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)(1 + 𝜏𝑏)
+
𝑇𝑗
(1 + 𝜏𝑐) )
 
 
𝛾
∙ (1 − 𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
1−𝛾
)
 
 
1−𝜎
1 − 𝜎
+ 𝛽2
(
(1 + 𝑟𝑡+3 − 𝛿)𝑘3,𝑗,𝑡+2 + ?̃?
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)
)
𝛾(1−𝜎)
1 − 𝜎
 
−𝜆𝑗,𝑡𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+1 − 𝛽𝜇𝑗,𝑡+2 (𝑘3,𝑗,𝑡+2 − 𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+1(1 + 𝑟𝑡+2 − 𝛿)) 
with accompanying complementary slackness conditions 
 𝜇𝑗,𝑡+1 ≤ 0 
𝑘3,𝑗,𝑡+2 − 𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+1(1 + 𝑟𝑡+2 − 𝛿) ≥ 0 
 𝜇𝑗,𝑡+1 (𝑘3,𝑗,𝑡+2 − 𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+1(1 + 𝑟𝑡+2 − 𝛿)) = 0 
 𝜆𝑗,𝑡+1 ≤ 0 
𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+1 ≥ 0 
 𝜆𝑗,𝑡+1𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+1 = 0 
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First order conditions for labour-leisure choices: 
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡
= [(𝑐1𝑗,𝑡)
𝛾
(1 − 𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡)
1−𝛾
]
−𝜎
[(1 − 𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡)
1−𝛾
𝛾(𝑐1,𝑗,𝑡)
𝛾−1 (1 − 𝜏𝑙
𝑗
)
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)
𝑤𝑗,𝑡
− (𝑐1,𝑗,𝑡)
𝛾
(1 − 𝛾)(1 − 𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡)
−𝛾
] = 0
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1
= 𝛽 [(𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
𝛾
(1 − 𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
1−𝛾
]
−𝜎
[(1 − 𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
1−𝛾
𝛾(𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
𝛾−1 (1 − 𝜏𝑙
𝑗
)
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)
𝑤𝑗,𝑡
− (𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
𝛾
(1 − 𝛾)(1 − 𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
−𝛾
] = 0
which reduces to two Euler equations for labour leisure choice: 
(1 − 𝜏𝑙
𝑗
)
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)
𝑤𝑗,𝑡 =
(1 − 𝛾)
𝛾
𝑐1,𝑗,𝑡
1 − 𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡
[
(1 − 𝜏𝑙
𝑗
)
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)
𝑤𝑗,𝑡 =
𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1
1 − 𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1
(1 − 𝛾)
𝛾
] 
First order conditions for pension savings: 
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑘3,𝑗,𝑡+2
= −𝛽 ((𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
𝛾
(1 − 𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
1−𝛾
)
−𝜎
𝛾(𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
𝛾−1
(1 − 𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
1−𝛾 1
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)(1 + 𝜏𝑏)
+ 𝛽2𝛾(𝑐3,𝑗,𝑡+2)
𝛾(1−𝜎)−1 1
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)
(1 + 𝑟𝑡+3 − 𝛿) − 𝛽𝜇𝑗,𝑡+1 = 0 
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+1
= −((𝑐1,𝑗,𝑡)
𝛾
(1 − 𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡)
1−𝛾
)
−𝜎
𝛾(𝑐1,𝑗,𝑡)
𝛾−1
(1 − 𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡)
1−𝛾 1
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)(1 + 𝜏𝑏)
+ 𝛽 ((𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
𝛾
(1 − 𝑙2,𝑗,,𝑡+1)
1−𝛾
)
−𝜎
𝛾(𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
𝛾−1
(1
− 𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
1−𝛾 1
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)(1 + 𝜏𝑏)
(1 + 𝑟𝑡+2 − 𝛿) − 𝜆𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽𝜇𝑗,𝑡+1(1 + 𝑟𝑡+2 − 𝛿) = 0 
which reduce to two Euler equations for an interior solution in the two pension savings choices: 
1 = 𝛽 ((
𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1
𝑐1,𝑗,𝑡
)
𝛾
(
1 − 𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1
1 − 𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡
)
1−𝛾
)
1−𝜎
(
𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1
𝑐1,𝑗,𝑡
)
−1
(1 + 𝑟𝑡+2 − 𝛿) 
1 = 𝛽 (
𝑐3,𝑗,𝑡+2
𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1
)
𝛾(1−𝜎)−1
(
1
(1 − 𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
)
(1−𝛾)(1−𝜎)
(1 + 𝜏𝑏)(1 + 𝑟𝑡+3 − 𝛿) 
For a corner solution, in which 𝑠2,𝑗,𝑡+1 = 𝑘3,𝑗,𝑡+2 − 𝑘2,𝑗,𝑡+1(1 + 𝑟𝑡+2 − 𝛿) = 0 and 𝜇𝑗,𝑡+1 < 0: 
45 
 
𝛾(1 − 𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
(1−𝛾)(1−𝜎)
(𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
𝛾(1−𝜎)−1 1
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)(1 + 𝜏𝑏)
= 𝛽𝛾(𝑐3,𝑗,𝑡+2)
𝛾(1−𝜎)−1 1
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)
(1 + 𝑟𝑡+3 − 𝛿) − 𝜇𝑗,𝑡+1 
𝛾(1 − 𝑙1,𝑗,𝑡)
(1−𝛾)(1−𝜎)
(𝑐1,𝑗,𝑡)
𝛾(1−𝜎)−1 1
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)(1 + 𝜏𝑏)
= 𝛽𝛾(1 − 𝑙2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
(1−𝛾)(1−𝜎)
(𝑐2,𝑗,𝑡+1)
𝛾(1−𝜎)−1 1
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)(1 + 𝜏𝑏)
(1 + 𝑟𝑡+2 − 𝛿)
+ 𝛽𝜇𝑗,𝑡+1(1 + 𝑟𝑡+2 − 𝛿) 
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